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NO. 47694-2020
JEROME COUNTY NO. CR27-18-6751

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Ryan Lee Weems pied guilty to one count of grand theft and was sentenced to a unified
term of five years, with three years fixed, with the court retaining jurisdiction. Mr. Weems
appeals, asserting the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence.
Specifically, he contends the district court erred in failing to place him on probation.

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
In 2018, a complaint was filed charging Mr. Weems with one count of grand theft in
response to a theft that occurred at the Walmart in Jerome a couple months earlier. (R., pp.7-12.)
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Mr. Weems waived his preliminary hearing and was bound over to the district court. (R., pp.3336.) An Information was then filed charging Mr. Weems with one count of grand theft.
(R., pp.41-42.)
A plea agreement was reached where Mr. Weems would plead guilty to grand theft; and
the State would recommend a unified sentence of five years, with three years fixed, and for that
sentenced to be suspended and Mr. Weems placed on probation for four years. (R., pp.61-63;
02/11/19 Tr., p.4, L.11-p.5, L.1.) Mr. Weems also agreed to pay restitution and to serve 30 days
of jail time, with credit for 29 days served. (R., pp.61-63; 02/11/19 Tr., p.4, L.11 -p.5, L.1.)
Mr. Weems was sentenced in November 2019. (R., pp.86-88.) Because Mr. Weems had
failed to appear for a previously scheduled sentencing hearing, the parties agreed that the State
was no longer obligated to give the sentencing recommendations required by the plea agreement.
(11/18/19 Tr., p.10, Ls.11-23.) The State then recommended a unified sentence of five years,
with three years fixed, with the court retaining jurisdiction. (11/18/19 Tr., p.12, Ls.17-20.)
Counsel for Mr. Weems did not recommend a specific sentence; instead, he just asked for
probation. (11/18/19 Tr., p.15, Ls.10-14.) Mr. Weems made a statement to the court, also asking
the court for a chance at probation. (11/18/19 Tr., p.16, Ls.17-18.) The court then imposed a
unified sentence of five years, with three years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (11/18/19
Tr., p.25, Ls.11-16; R., pp.89-92.)
Mr. Weems timely appealed. (R., pp.94-96.)
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ISSUE
After Mr. Weems pled guilty to grand theft, did the district court abuse its discretion when it
imposed a unified sentence of five years, with three years fixed, with the court retaining
jurisdiction, instead of placing him on probation?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing A Unified Sentence Of Five Years, With
Three Years Fixed, With The Court Retaining Jurisdiction, Instead Of Placing Mr. Weems On
Probation

A.

Introduction
Mr. Weems asserts the district court abused its discretion when it retained jurisdiction

and imposed a unified sentence of five years, with three years fixed. Specifically, he asserts that
had the district court given the substantial amount of mitigating evidence in the record its proper
weight, the court should have placed him on probation.

B.

Standard Of Review
There are "four objectives of criminal punishment: (1) protection of society, (2)

deterrence of the individual and the public generally, (3) possibility of rehabilitation, and (4)
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing." State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982)
(citing State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384 (1978)). However, "the primary consideration is the
good order and protection of society, [and a]ll other factors must be subservient to that end." Id.
(internal quotation marks and citations removed). Even so, Idaho law prefers avoiding
imprisonment for defendants unless certain aggravating factors are found.
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The court shall deal with a person who has been convicted of a crime without
imposing sentence of imprisonment unless, having regard to the nature and
circumstances of the crime and the history, character and condition of the
defendant, it is of the opinion that imprisonment is appropriate for protection of
the public.
I.C. § 19-2521 (emphasis added). 1
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "'[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing
the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho
573 (1979)).
When this Court reviews an alleged abuse of discretion by a trial court the
sequence of inquiry requires consideration of four essentials. Whether the trial
court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the
outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by
the exercise of reason.
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018) (emphasis in original).

In this case, Mr. Weems contends the district court abused its discretion by failing to
exercise reason in its ultimate sentencing decision. "[R]easonableness is a fundamental
requirement." State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90 (1982). "'[R]easonableness' implies that a term of
confinement should be tailored to the purposes for which the sentence is imposed." Toohill, l 03
Idaho at 568.

1

The amended version of this statute that takes effect July 1, 2020, further strengthens this
preference by clearly stating, "The sentencing court should first consider placement in the
community." ID LEGIS 210 (2020), 2020 Idaho Laws Ch. 210 (S.B. 1340).
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C.

The District Court Did Not Give Sufficient Weight To Mitigating Factors That Should
Have Led It To Place Mr. Weems On Probation Instead Of Executing A Prison Sentence
Courts are required to consider mitigating evidence in favor of the defendant. State v.

Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002) (noting that when reviewing a sentence, Idaho's appellate
courts will "review the record on appeal, having due regard for the nature of the offense, the

character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest") (emphasis added); State v.
Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726 (2007) (same). The record in this case reflects a wealth of mitigating
evidence that should have weighed in favor of the court placing Mr. Weems on probation,
including his mental health, his drug abuse problems, his voluntary rehabilitation from
prescription medication abuse, his willingness and ability to pay restitution to the victim of his
crime, his expressions of remorse for his actions, and his lack of prior felony convictions.
Mr. Weems asserts that, had the district court given that mitigating evidence its proper weight,
the district court should have been led to place Mr. Weems on probation. By retaining
jurisdiction instead, Mr. Weems asserts the district court did not exercise reason and abused its
discretion.
"[O]ne of the factors that must be considered and weighed by the court at sentencing" is
the defendant's mental health. State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 461 (2002); see also State v.

Odiaga, 125 Idaho 384, 391 (1994) ("Idaho Code § 19-2523, which requires that the trial court
consider the defendant's mental illness as a sentencing factor, was an integral part of the
legislature's repeal of mental condition as a defense."). While Idaho Code § 19-2523 "does not
require that a defendant's mental condition be the controlling factor at sentencing . . . the record
has to show that 'the court adequately considered the substance of the factors"' [from the statute]
when it imposed the sentence." State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 132-33 (2011) (quoting Strand,
137 Idaho at 461).
5

The record in this case has a significant amount of evidence regarding how Mr. Weems'
mental health impacted him throughout his entire life. Mr. Weems reported he had lost a job as a
truck driver "due to a mental breakdown where [he] was placed on antidepressants and anxiety
medications." (PSI, p.19.) The mental health evaluation stated that, as of the date of the
evaluation, Mr. Weems "reported last feeling significantly disturbed by any kind of nerve,
mental, or psychological problems 3 to 7 days ago and on 5 out of the past 90 days." (PSI, p.45.)
The mental health evaluation reported that Mr. Weems had been diagnosed with "anxiety or
phobia disorder [and] major depression," and that he had been "prescribed Alprazolam and
Citalopram" for those conditions. (PSI, p.46.) Mr. Weems also disclosed during the presentence
investigation process that he had been diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder
("ADHD") as a child and "struggled ... in school" due to that condition. (PSI, pp.25, 27.) He
had been prescribed Ritalin for ADHD, but experienced "adverse side [effects] so [his] parents"
stopped the medication. (PSI, p.25.) As a result, he "had a hard time concentrating in school."
(PSI, p.25.) While the mental health evaluation did not make any specific recommendations for
mental health treatment, it did acknowledge his mental health was a factor by noting that
"[s]hould [Mr. Weems'] mental health symptoms persist or worsen, it is recommended he talk
with his mental health provider to discuss treatment options." (PSI, p.47.) Before the incident
that led to these charges, he described having a "a panic attack" after he arrived late to a job
interview. (PSI, p.19.)
In addition, a sentencing court must give "proper consideration of the defendant's
[substance abuse] problem, the part it played in causing defendant to commit the crime and the
suggested alternatives for treating the problem." State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982). While
being under the influence of drugs or alcohol "is not sufficient in itself to raise a defense to the
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cnme, it is our conclusion that any arguable impact of such substance abuse is a proper
consideration in mitigation of punishment upon sentencing." State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 414
n.5 (1981). Voluntary drug addiction rehabilitation from "abuse of prescription medications" is
also a mitigating factor that should be considered by courts at sentencing. State v. Shideler, 103
Idaho 593, 595 (1982).
The record is replete with examples of the problems caused by Mr. Weems' drug abuse.
When discussing the incident that led to these charges, Mr. Weems described how he "took a
couple of [his prescribed Xanax] due to a panic attack [he] started to have." (PSI, p.19.) He
reported that those pills "put him in a haze," and, as a result, he did "not [completely] remember
his time inside" the store from which he stole the goods. (PSI, p.19.) The presentence
investigator stated that Mr. Weems "admitted he took more than his prescribed dose," and that he
had been "abusing his Xanax prescription" before this incident occurred. (PSI, pp.19, 30.) But
Mr. Weems also described how he had voluntarily started his rehabilitation by "list[ing] no
longer being on prescription medication as a goal he has already met." (PSI, p.31.)
In addition to his abuse of prescription medication, Mr. Weems described how he began
using alcohol and marijuana at

, and methamphetamine at

. (PSI, p.30.)

Mr. Weems' GAIN evaluation listed provisional diagnoses of disorders associated with alcohol,
amphetamines, and cannabis. (PSI, pp.36-37.) During sentencing, the State remarked that
"there's definitely indicators ofa substance use issue." (11/18/19 Tr., p.19, Ls.7-9.) Mr. Weems'
family described some of the issues that they had witnessed due to his drug abuse. (PSI, pp.5354.) Even his ex-wife stated that he is a "drug addict" and that he has "been [through] treatment
but can never stay clean." (PSI, pp.50-51.) She also described how she believed he needed
treatment so he could "be an active member of society." (PSI, p.52.) During sentencing, the court
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engaged counsel for both sides in a lengthy discussion regarding Mr. Weems' past treatment and
how the evaluations seemed to indicate that he might need treatment, despite the overall
recommendations that he did not. (See 11/18/19 Tr., p.16, L.19 - p.19, L.15.) Mr. Weems
"indicated he attended Intensive Outpatient Treatment Walla Walla, Washington, in 2015 [and]
explained he did not finish his treatment as he moved before graduating." (PSI, pp.29-30.)
The Idaho Legislature has required courts to consider whether "[t ]he defendant has
compensated or will compensate the victim of his criminal conduct for the damage or injury that
was sustained" as a mitigating factor. LC. § 19-2521(2); see also State v. Hall, 114 Idaho 887,
889 (Ct. App. 1988) (treating the defendant's "expressed willingness to provide restitution" as a
mitigating factor). In making that determination, courts should also consider the defendant's
employability and prospects for actually paying restitution and other obligations. See, e.g.,
State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90-91 (1982) (highlighting the fact that the defendant was a skilled a
mechanic who was employed as a truck driver at the time of his sentencing, then going on to
reduce the defendant's sentence, in part, because he "was working and helping to support his
children at the time of the conviction"); State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982) (reducing
sentence of defendant who, inter alia, had been steadily employed, enjoyed his work, and
expressed a desire to advance within his company); State v. Mitchell, 77 Idaho 115, 119 (1955)
(finding that it was error for court to fail to consider, inter alia, a defendant's gainful
employment in determining the appropriate sentence); see also State v. Hagedorn, 129 Idaho
155, 161 (Ct. App. 1996) (approvingly referencing the district court's consideration of the
defendant's good employment history in mitigation); State v. Baiz, 120 Idaho 292, 293 (Ct. App.
1991) (treating the fact that the defendant "was a reliable and hard worker when employed" as
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mitigating, but nevertheless affirming his concurrent fifteen years sentences for two counts of
delivery of heroin).
The record reflects that Mr. Weems wanted to pay restitution for his offense, and was
capable of doing so. He told the court, "I want to pay restitution. I want to take care of what I
need to take care of I want to be able to work. That way I can support my family in the way I
can. I can't be with them, but I can still support them." (11/18/19 Tr., p.16, Ls.3-8.) Mr. Weems
reported that he had "a truck driving job lined up with the pastor of [his] church," but expressed
concerns about his commercial driver's license expiring if he was sent on a rider. (11/18/19
Tr., p.16, Ls.10-17.)
Courts should also consider as mitigating expressions of remorse and whether "the
defendant has accepted responsibility for his acts." See, e.g., State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593,
595 (1982) (reducing sentence of defendant who, inter alia, "expressed regret for what he had
done, especially for the effect it had upon his family and friends, but also indicated that he was
confident he could be a productive citizen in the future"); see also State v. Coffin, 146 Idaho 166,
171 (Ct. App. 2008) ("Coffin points to several mitigating circumstances that he contends
rendered his sentence unreasonably long . . . [including] his expression of remorse for his
conduct."); State v. Carrasco, 114 Idaho 348, 354-55 (Ct. App. 1988) (treating as mitigating the
fact that the defendant "acknowledged the wrongfulness of the [drug sale] transaction and he
openly expressed contrition for his acts"), reversed on other grounds, 117 Idaho 295 (1990));
State v. Caudill, l 09 Idaho 222, 224 (1985) ("The sentencing judge found several mitigating

factors, including Caudill's ... remorse.").
Mr. Weems expressed his remorse to the court when he said, "I deserve everything that's
happened to me." (11/18/19 Tr., p.16, Ls.2-3.) But that statement was not the only time he
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expressed his sorrow for his actions. The presentence investigator wrote, "When asked how he
felt about having committed this crime now, [Mr. Weems] wrote, 'it destroyed my life I
destroyed something I worked so hard for."' (PSI, p.19.) A letter from his family described
Mr. Weems as being "embarrassed, ashamed and wanting to make things right." (PSI, p.53.)
Another mitigating factor to be considered is a defendant's lack of prior felony
convictions. See, e.g., State v. Caudill, 109 Idaho 222, 224 (1985) ("The sentencing judge found
several mitigating factors, including Caudill's youthful age, prior nonviolent nature, lack of prior
criminal record, potential for rehabilitation, and remorse."); State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91
(1982) (reducing a sentence "in the interest of justice," in part, "[i]n light ofthe defendant's past
record and the circumstances surrounding the case" which included the fact it was the
defendant's first felony); State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982) (reducing defendant's
sentence, in part, because it "was the defendant's first felony"); State v. O'Dell, 71 Idaho 64, 69
(1950) (explaining that one of the purposes of LC. § 19-2601 is "the reformation and
rehabilitation of a defendant, particularly a first offender"); State v. Hoskins, 131 Idaho 670, 673
(Ct. App. 1998) (holding that consecutive sentences were "unduly harsh," in part, because they
were his "first felony charges"). Prior to the actions that led to these charges, the record reflects
that Mr. Weems had no felony convictions. (11/18/19 Tr., p.15, Ls.10-14.)
The record in this case shows that Mr. Weems was a good candidate for probation. He
took responsibility for his failure to appear for his original sentencing date, explaining that he
was working in a remote area where weather conditions prevented him from leaving or
contacting his attorney and the court. (See 11/18/19 Tr., p.13, L.20 - p.14, L.9.) His attorney
explained that "when the weather did clear up ... he returned to the Treasure Valley and turned
himself in. . . . [H]e did the right thing." (11/18/19 Tr., p.14, Ls.9-13.) Mr. Weems had

voluntarily rehabilitated from abuse of prescription medication, expressed remorse for his
actions, and had learned about community-based treatment resources he was not previously
aware of which were available to help with his mental health and substance abuse issues.
(See 11/18/19 Tr., p.15, Ls.21-22.) Mr. Weems had also arranged employment as a truck driver

that would have enabled him to pay restitution for his crime, but his commercial driver's license
expired as a result of the court retaining jurisdiction, prolonging his ability to pay restitution
when he is released from incarceration. (See 11/18/19 Tr., p.16, Ls.10-17.) Accordingly,
Mr. Weems asserts that had all of these mitigating factors been given their proper weight, the
court should have placed him on probation. Accordingly, Mr. Weems asserts that his sentence is
excessive considering any view of the facts. Jackson, 130 Idaho at 294.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Weems respectfully requests that this Court remand his case with instructions that he
is to be placed on probation. Alternatively, he requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it
deems appropriate.
DATED this 11 th day of June, 2020.
/s/ R. Jonathan Shirts
R. JONATHAN SHIRTS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 11 th day of June, 2020, I caused a true and correct
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